INA §§ 1225 vs. 1226: Federal Circuit Split on Immigration Detention

Current split: 8–2. Eight federal courts of appeals—the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits—have rejected DHS’s interpretation of INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), as applied to noncitizens who entered without inspection and were later arrested in the interior of the United States. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have adopted DHS’s interpretation and held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory detention without bond in these circumstances.

On August 28, 2026, the Third Circuit joined the majority side of the split in Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, holding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) did not apply to the petitioners and affirming their release. The court separately held that their detention without bond hearings violated procedural due process.

An appeal presenting the statutory issue remains pending in the Fourth Circuit.

CircuitCaseResultStatus

1st Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz§ 1226(a) — 🟢 Bond Eligible Decided Aug. 13, 2026
2d Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden§ 1226(a) — 🟢 Bond Eligible Decided
3d Buele Morocho v. Jamison District Court § 1226(a) — 🟢 Bond Eligible Decided Aug. 28, 2026
4thLopez Garcia v. Perry District Court § 1226(a) — ⚪ Appeal Pending
5thBuenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi§ 1225(b)(2)(A) — 🔴 Mandatory Detention Decided
6th Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft§ 1226(a) — 🟢 Bond Eligible Decided
7th Rojas v. Olson§ 1226(a) — 🟢 Bond Eligible Decided
8th Avila v. Bondi § 1225(b)(2)(A) — 🔴 Mandatory Detention Decided
9th Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock§ 1226(a) — 🟢 Bond Eligible Decided
10th Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin§ 1226(a) — 🟢 Bond Eligible Decided
11th Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden§ 1226(a) — 🟢 Bond Eligible Decided

Current split: 7–2. Seven federal courts of appeals have held that § 1226(a) governs the relevant detention, while the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have adopted DHS's interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Appeals presenting the issue remain pending in the Third and Fourth Circuits.

First Circuit

Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz

Nos. 25-2152 & 26-1094 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 2026)
🟢 Result: § 1226(a) — Bond Eligible
District Court Grants of Habeas Affirmed

Facts. José Arnulfo Guerrero Orellana, a Salvadoran national, entered the United States without inspection, admission, or parole and had resided in the country since 2013. ICE arrested him during a vehicle stop in Everett, Massachusetts, in September 2025 and placed him in removal proceedings. DHS treated him as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). He filed a habeas petition challenging his detention without access to a bond hearing.

The district court initially ordered the government either to release him or provide a bond hearing. An immigration judge subsequently ordered his release on a $3,500 bond. The district court later certified a class and held that class members were governed by § 1226(a), rather than the mandatory-detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Issue. Whether a noncitizen who entered the United States without inspection and was arrested in the interior years later must be detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without eligibility for bond, or instead is detained under § 1226(a) and may be considered for release on bond.

Holding. Section 1226(a) applies. The First Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that Guerrero Orellana and the class were not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and were instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits consideration for release on bond.

Key Reasoning. The court distinguished between being an “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission.” Although a person present in the United States without having been admitted is statutorily deemed an applicant for admission, § 1225(b)(2)(A) additionally refers to a noncitizen who is “seeking admission.” The First Circuit concluded that “seeking admission” means seeking lawful entry into the United States. Because Guerrero Orellana had already entered the country years earlier, he was not “seeking admission” within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The court also emphasized the historical practice: for nearly thirty years after IIRIRA, immigration authorities detained noncitizens who had entered without inspection under § 1226, absent another mandatory-detention provision. DHS changed that position in July 2025 and began treating such individuals as subject to § 1225 mandatory detention without bond.

Second Circuit

Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden

No. 25-3141-pr (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026)
🟢 Result: § 1226(a) — Bond Eligible
District Court Grants of Habeas Affirmed

Facts. Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha, a Brazilian national, entered the United States without inspection or admission in approximately 2004 or 2005 and remained in the country for more than twenty years. He applied for asylum in 2016 and received work authorization. He lived with his wife and two U.S.-citizen children, owned a home and construction business, and had never been arrested or charged with a crime. ICE arrested him while he was driving to work in September 2025.

An immigration judge initially found him subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible for bond. The district court granted habeas relief and ordered the government either to provide a bond hearing or release him. At the subsequent hearing, an immigration judge found that he presented neither a danger nor a flight risk and released him on bond.

Issue. Whether detention of a noncitizen who entered without inspection, lived in the United States for many years, and was later arrested in the interior is governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A), requiring detention without bond, or by § 1226(a), allowing consideration for release on bond.

Holding. Section 1226(a) applies. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas relief. It held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to a noncitizen like Barbosa da Cunha who is already present in the United States after entering without inspection and admission and who was not apprehended at or near the border at the time of entry.

Key Reasoning. The Second Circuit concluded that the statutory text requires more than merely being an “applicant for admission.” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) also refers to a person “seeking admission.” Barbosa da Cunha qualified as an applicant for admission because he was present without having been admitted, but after living in the interior for approximately twenty years he was not presently seeking lawful entry into the United States. Instead, he was seeking relief from removal.

The court also found that § 1226(a)'s text itself encompasses him: it broadly applies to a noncitizen arrested and detained pending a decision whether the person is to be removed, and does not restrict its application to previously admitted noncitizens charged as deportable.

The court found its interpretation reinforced by the INA's context, structure, history, and purpose, Supreme Court precedent, and approximately thirty years of Executive Branch practice across five presidential administrations. It additionally concluded that, even if DHS's interpretation were plausible, constitutional avoidance weighed against construing the statute to create an extraordinarily broad mandatory-detention-without-bond regime.

Third Circuit

Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC

Nos. 26-1150 & 26-1454 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026)
🟢 Result: § 1226(a) — Bond Eligible
District Court Grants of Habeas Affirmed

Facts. Gabriel Antonio Buele Morocho, a citizen of Ecuador, entered the United States without inspection in 2001, and Wanderson Lopes De Andrade, a citizen of Brazil, entered without inspection in 2014. Both remained in the United States for many years before ICE arrested them in late 2025 and early 2026 and detained them without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Their detention reflected a change in the government's interpretation of the INA. Until 2025, noncitizens like the petitioners—those who had entered without inspection and had been present in the United States for years—were detained or released under § 1226(a). In 2025, following Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the government began using § 1225(b)(2)(A) to detain such noncitizens without bond.

Both petitioners filed habeas petitions challenging the government's statutory authority to detain them without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The district courts granted habeas relief and released them. The government appealed.

Issue. Whether detention of noncitizens who entered without inspection, lived in the United States for many years, and were later arrested in the interior is governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A), requiring detention without bond, or by § 1226(a), allowing consideration for release on bond.

Holding. Section 1226(a) applies. The Third Circuit affirmed the grants of habeas relief. It held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like the petitioners who entered without inspection, remained in the United States for years, and were later arrested in the interior rather than at the border. Their detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) was therefore unlawful.

Key Reasoning. Like the Second Circuit in Barbosa da Cunha, the Third Circuit concluded that the statutory text requires more than merely being an “applicant for admission.” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) separately refers to an “alien seeking admission.” Because Congress did not define “seeking admission,” the court applied the phrase's ordinary meaning and emphasized Congress's use of the present participle “seeking,” which describes a current or ongoing action.

Accordingly, an “applicant for admission” falls within § 1225(b)(2)(A) only when the person is presently or continually taking affirmative action to obtain “admission”—lawful entry after inspection and authorization. The petitioners had taken no such affirmative action. Treating every “applicant for admission” as necessarily “seeking admission” would also render the latter phrase superfluous.

The court further concluded that the INA's broader structure supports this interpretation. Section 1225 principally governs noncitizens arriving at and seeking entry into the United States, while § 1226 generally governs the apprehension and detention of noncitizens already within the country pending removal proceedings. The court relied on the Supreme Court's description in Jennings v. Rodriguez of the same statutory division.

The Third Circuit also rejected the government's argument that IIRIRA eliminated this distinction. Although IIRIRA unified exclusion and deportation proceedings into a single removal process, the court concluded that Congress did not eliminate the separate detention tracks for arriving noncitizens and those already present in the United States. The court found this interpretation consistent with the Executive Branch's longstanding practice: from IIRIRA's implementation in 1997 until the government's change in position in 2025, noncitizens present in the United States after entry without inspection were treated as eligible for discretionary release under § 1226(a).

The court additionally relied on the relationship between § 1225 and § 1226 after the Laken Riley Act. Congress amended § 1226(c) in 2025 to require mandatory detention of specified categories of inadmissible noncitizens involved in certain criminal conduct. The court reasoned that if § 1225(b)(2)(A) already required mandatory detention of all unadmitted noncitizens found in the interior, much of § 1226(c)'s mandatory-detention scheme would be unnecessary. The petitioners themselves were not subject to § 1226(c).

Due Process. The Third Circuit separately held that the petitioners' detention without bond hearings violated the Fifth Amendment's procedural Due Process Clause. Unlike a noncitizen apprehended at the threshold of initial entry, the petitioners had lived in the United States for many years and had established connections to the country. The court therefore rejected the government's reliance on the “entry fiction” applicable to certain noncitizens at or near the border.

Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, the court found that physical detention implicated a fundamental liberty interest; detention without an opportunity for a neutral decisionmaker to assess danger or flight risk created a high risk of erroneous deprivation of that liberty; and the government's legitimate interests in preventing danger and flight did not outweigh those considerations where the petitioners had no criminal records, there was no evidence that either posed a danger or flight risk, and the government had not shown that providing bond hearings would be unduly burdensome. The court therefore held that their detention without bond hearings violated procedural due process.

Disposition. The Third Circuit affirmed the district courts' orders granting habeas relief and releasing the petitioners.

Fourth Circuit — Appeal Pending

Lopez Garcia v. Perry

No. 1:25-cv-1764 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2025)
🟢 District Court Result: § 1226(a) — Bond Hearing Ordered
Fourth Circuit: APPEAL PENDING — No controlling circuit decision yet

Facts. Oscar Enrique Lopez Garcia, a citizen of Guatemala, had continuously resided in the United States since approximately 1996. On October 9, 2025, he was stopped by law enforcement and subsequently taken into ICE custody. He was detained at the Caroline Detention Center and challenged the legality of his detention through a petition for habeas corpus. The government maintained that his detention was mandatory under § 1225(b)(2).

Issue. Whether a noncitizen who had resided in the United States for more than two decades before being taken into ICE custody was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) or instead entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).

District Court Holding. Section 1226(a) applies. Judge Patricia Tolliver Giles of the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the government's position that Lopez Garcia was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and held that he was entitled to an immediate bond hearing under § 1226(a).

Key Reasoning. The district court rejected DHS's argument that any noncitizen without lawful status is necessarily subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Relying on prior decisions from the Eastern District of Virginia, the court reasoned that § 1225 applies to arriving noncitizens, whereas § 1226 generally governs the arrest and detention of noncitizens already present in the United States pending removal proceedings. Lopez Garcia had lived in the United States for more than two decades and was taken into ICE custody following an interior law-enforcement stop.

Relief. The court granted the habeas petitionin part and ordered the government to provide Lopez Garcia with a standard § 1226(a) bond hearing within 14 days. It also enjoined the government from denying release on the ground that § 1225(b)(2) made his detention mandatory. The court reserved ruling on his request for immediate release.

The court further directed that, if the government sought continued detention, it had to establish dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence or flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence.

Appellate Status. The appeal is pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit has not yet issued a controlling decision on the § 1225(b)(2)/§ 1226(a) question.

Fifth Circuit — § 1225(b)(2) Mandatory Detention

Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi

166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026)
🔴 Fifth Circuit Result: § 1225(b)(2) — Mandatory Detention; No Bond Hearing
District Court Decisions Reversed

Facts. Victor Buenrostro-Mendez and Jose Padron Covarrubias were Mexican citizens who entered the United States without inspection years before their 2025 arrests—Buenrostro-Mendez in 2009 and Covarrubias in 2001. DHS treated them as inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), placed them in removal proceedings, and detained them under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Immigration judges concluded that they were ineligible for bond hearings.

Both men then sought habeas relief in the Southern District of Texas. The district courts rejected the government's interpretation and concluded that § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governed their detention. After obtaining habeas relief, both petitioners received bond hearings and were released. The government appealed, and the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.

Issue. Whether noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection and remained in the country for years are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or instead may seek release on bond under § 1226(a).

Fifth Circuit Holding. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district courts and held that the government's interpretation of the INA was correct.

The court emphasized that § 1225(a)(1) expressly provides that a noncitizen present in the United States who has not been admitted is deemed an “applicant for admission.” In the Fifth Circuit's view, an applicant for admission is necessarily “seeking admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A), even if the individual entered without inspection many years earlier.

Practical Effect. For noncitizens covered by the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A), detention is mandatory and there is no statutory right to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district-court orders requiring bond hearings or release.

Supreme Court Status. A petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed, No. 26-43.

Sixth Circuit — § 1226(a) Bond Eligibility

Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft

175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026)
🟢 Result: § 1226 — Bond Eligibility
District Court Habeas Judgments Affirmed

Facts. This consolidated appeal involved noncitizens from Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Guatemala who had lived in the United States without lawful status for years. ICE or CBP arrested them, charged them with entry without inspection, and detained them under § 1225(b)(2)(A), relying on the BIA's decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. Immigration judges generally concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to grant bond.

The petitioners filed habeas petitions in the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan. The district courts held that § 1226(a) governed their detention and that they should have access to bond hearings. Most of the district courts also concluded that detention without a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The government released the petitioners following the district-court orders and appealed.

Issue. Whether a noncitizen arrested in the interior of the United States after previously entering without inspection is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or the generally discretionary detention regime of § 1226.

Sixth Circuit Holding.Section 1226 applies. In a 2–1 decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district courts' judgments and rejected the government's attempt to place these petitioners within § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory-detention regime.

The Sixth Circuit distinguished between being statutorily deemed an “applicant for admission” and actually “seeking admission.” It concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply merely because a person who entered without inspection is deemed an applicant for admission. The court joined the Second and Eleventh Circuits in holding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens in the petitioners' circumstances.

Practical Effect. Within the Sixth Circuit, noncitizens in this category are not automatically subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory detention merely because they entered without inspection. Their detention is governed by § 1226, subject to the INA's other statutory restrictions on bond eligibility.

Dissent. Judge Murphy dissented from the majority's interpretation.

Supreme Court Status. A petition for certiorari has been filed, No. 25-1415.

Seventh Circuit — § 1226(a) Bond Eligibility

Rojas v. Olson

No. 25-3127 (7th Cir. July 30, 2026)
🟢 Result: § 1226(a) — Bond Eligibility
District Court Denial of Habeas Reversed

Facts. Jaciel Cirrus Rojas, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States without inspection in 2018. DHS arrested him in June 2025 under a warrant citing § 1226. An immigration judge found that he was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk and ordered him released on bond. DHS then changed its position, asserting that § 1225(b)(2)(A), rather than § 1226, required his mandatory detention without bond.

The BIA subsequently reversed the immigration judge's bond order based on Matter of Yajure Hurtado, and the Eastern District of Wisconsin agreed with DHS and denied Rojas's habeas petition. Rojas appealed.

Issue. Whether a noncitizen who entered without inspection years earlier, lives in the interior of the United States, and is not presently seeking admission is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or is instead eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a).

Seventh Circuit Holding. Section 1226(a) applies. The Seventh Circuit held that although Rojas was statutorily deemed an “applicant for admission,” he was not “seeking admission.” Accordingly, § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory-detention provision did not apply to him.

The court emphasized the distinction between the statutory fiction of being an “applicant for admission” and the factual question whether the individual is actually “seeking admission.” Rojas had entered years earlier and was seeking asylum and withholding of removal—not admission into the United States.

Disposition. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief and remanded with instructions to issue the writ. It expressly held that Rojas was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and was eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a).

Important Limitation. The court described its holding as limited: it did not hold that every noncitizen present without admission is necessarily bond eligible. Rather, it held that persons present in the country without admission who are not “seeking admission” do not fall within § 1225(b)(2)(A) and instead fall under § 1226, subject to the INA's other requirements.

Dissent. Judge Sykes dissented, agreeing with the broader interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) reflected in Judge Murphy's dissent in Lopez-Campos.

Eighth Circuit — § 1225(b)(2)(A) Mandatory Detention

Avila v. Bondi

170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026)
🔴 Eighth Circuit Result: § 1225(b)(2)(A) — Mandatory Detention; No Bond Hearing
District Court Grant of Habeas Reversed

Facts. Joaquin Herrera Avila, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States without inspection or admission in 2006 and again in 2016. In August 2025, DHS encountered him during a traffic stop in Minnesota, arrested him, and initiated removal proceedings. DHS detained him without bond, and an immigration judge denied his request for a bond redetermination hearing. Avila then sought habeas relief under § 1226(a).

The district court granted habeas relief, concluding that Avila was not “seeking admission” within § 1225(b)(2)(A) after living in the United States for years. It ordered the government either to release him or provide a bond hearing within seven days. Avila subsequently received a hearing and was released on a $7,500 bond.

Issue. Whether a noncitizen who entered without inspection and was later arrested in the interior is necessarily “seeking admission” because § 1225(a)(1) deems him an “applicant for admission,” thereby making § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s mandatory-detention provision applicable.

Eighth Circuit Holding. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court and adopted the Fifth Circuit's interpretation.

Key Reasoning. The court concluded that “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” are equivalent for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Because § 1225(a)(1) deems a person present without having been admitted an applicant for admission, that person remains “seeking admission” regardless of whether he is presently taking an affirmative step to obtain lawful entry. The court analogized the situation to a college applicant who continues to seek admission while an application remains pending.

Disposition. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's grant of habeas relief.

Ninth Circuit — § 1226(a) Bond Eligibility

Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock

No. 25-6842 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026)
🟢 Result: § 1226(a) — Bond Eligibility
District Court Judgment Affirmed

Facts. Ramon Rodriguez Vazquez entered the United States without admission or parole in 2009. Immigration authorities arrested him pursuant to a warrant in 2025 and placed him in removal proceedings. An immigration judge in Tacoma denied bond based on DHS's new interpretation that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandated his detention. Rodriguez Vazquez responded by filing a habeas petition and class-action complaint. The district court certified a class of individuals detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center under the challenged policy.

Issue. Whether noncitizens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or discretionary detention under § 1226(a) with potential eligibility for bond.

Ninth Circuit Holding. Section 1226(a) applies. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the class, holding that noncitizens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Key Reasoning. The court concluded from the statutory text and context that § 1225(b)(2)(A) is best understood as applying to noncitizens seeking to enter the United States at the border. Because “admission” is statutorily defined as lawful “entry” into the United States, a person “seeking admission” is engaged in the affirmative process of seeking such entry.

The Ninth Circuit rejected DHS's argument that every “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission,” reasoning that this interpretation creates surplusage and conflicts with ordinary language. The court also placed considerable weight on the government's longstanding post-IIRIRA practice: for nearly thirty years, the government treated unadmitted noncitizens apprehended in the interior as detained under § 1226(a), while § 1225(b)(2)(A) was understood to govern persons seeking entry at the border.

Dissent. Judge Bea dissented, concluding that persons deemed “applicants for admission” are necessarily “seeking admission” and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Disposition. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the certified class.

Tenth Circuit — § 1226(a) Bond Eligibility

Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin

180 F.4th 1226 (10th Cir. June 30, 2026)
🟢 Result: § 1226(a) — Bond Eligibility
District Court Denial of Habeas Reversed

Facts. Rigoberto Santillan Quiroz entered the United States in 2006 and lived here for approximately twenty years. He married a lawful permanent resident and became the stepfather of a U.S.-citizen child. ICE arrested him during a traffic stop on November 2, 2025 and initiated removal proceedings based on his entry without admission or parole. DHS detained him under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without an opportunity to seek bond.

Santillan Quiroz filed a § 2241 habeas petition arguing that § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A), governed his detention. A magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, but the district court rejected that recommendation and denied habeas relief.

Issue. Whether Santillan Quiroz, who had entered without inspection approximately twenty years earlier and was later arrested in the interior, was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or eligible to seek bond under § 1226(a).

Tenth Circuit Holding. Section 1226(a) applies. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed, holding that Santillan Quiroz was eligible for bond and entitled to meaningfully challenge his detention before an immigration judge.

Key Reasoning. The court rejected DHS's new interpretation as inconsistent with the statutory scheme. It emphasized that shortly after IIRIRA, the government itself interpreted the statutes to mean that arriving noncitizens were generally governed by § 1225, while persons present in the interior without having been admitted or paroled were eligible for bond under § 1226. That understanding persisted through five presidential administrations before DHS reversed course in July 2025.

The court also rejected the proposition that because § 1225(a)(1) deems someone an “applicant for admission,” the person must necessarily be “seeking admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Disposition. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the habeas petition.

Eleventh Circuit — § 1226(a) Bond Eligibility

Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Center Miami

175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026)
🟢 Result: § 1226(a) — Bond Eligibility
District Court Grants of Habeas Affirmed

Facts. The consolidated appeals involved Fidencio Hernandez Alvarez and Ismael Cerro Perez, Mexican nationals who entered without inspection and had lived in the United States since 2019 and 2015, respectively. Hernandez Alvarez had no criminal history and two U.S.-citizen children; Cerro Perez had three U.S.-citizen children and only minor traffic citations. Immigration authorities arrested both following traffic stops in September 2025.

DHS detained both without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A). They filed separate habeas petitions in the Southern District of Florida. The district court held that § 1226 governed their detention, making them eligible for bond, and the government appealed.

Issue. Whether unadmitted noncitizens apprehended in the interior of the United States are subject to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or discretionary detention with potential bond eligibility under § 1226(a).

Eleventh Circuit Holding. Section 1226 applies. The Eleventh Circuit rejected DHS's new interpretation and affirmed the grants of habeas relief.

Key Reasoning. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not merely require that a person qualify as an “applicant for admission”; it limits mandatory no-bond detention to an applicant who is “seeking admission.” Neither petitioner was seeking lawful entry after inspection when arrested, nor was either taking a cognizable step toward obtaining the rights and privileges associated with lawful entry. They were simply present in the United States when arrested following traffic stops.

The court concluded that the text and structure of the INA, the history of immigration detention, and Congress's purpose in enacting IIRIRA support treating § 1225(b)(2)(A) as generally applying to arriving noncitizens seeking lawful entry—not individuals who are simply present in the country's interior.

The court carefully limited its decision: it did not determine whether either petitioner was a flight risk or danger, and it did not hold that Congress lacks constitutional authority to mandate detention in these circumstances. It held only that Congress had not imposed such mandatory detention through the INA provisions before the court.

Disposition. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grants of habeas relief in both consolidated cases.